Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, presents on space security

Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, spoke on the subject of space security during this month's installment of the Space Security Lunch Series. The lunch series is co-sponsored by Secure World Foundation and the Aerospace Law and Policy Association at the University of Colorado Law School.

Krepon began his talk with a brief description of our dependence on space-based services, introducing how space weapons fundamentally threaten these services. He pointed out that various efforts have been undertaken to prevent the weaponization of space, some of which were or are extensions of existing approaches like nuclear deterrence. Other efforts currently under way include civil space situational awareness, in which data about location and movement of satellites is shared via a common data center using standardized data.

According to Krepon, there are three ways to address a specific form of space weapons, anti-satellite (ASAT) systems: Counter systems depending on a force projection or space dominance perspective, a treaty banning all space weapons, or a space code of conduct (or "rules of the road"). ASATs, by the way, include nuclear bombs, kinetic kill payloads and systems designed to temporarily disable a satellite. The latter is the approach considered most desirable by the U.S. Department of Defense. However, none of these options is ideal in terms of dealing with space weaponization.

The U.S. and Soviet Union have already banned nuclear detonations in space per a 1963 treaty following the destruction of several satellites after a exoatmospheric nuclear test. Further, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 bans nuclear weapons in space, along with other weapons of mass destruction. In terms of using a treaty to ban space weapons outright, this approach has not been popular with the United States because a treaty is designed to limit behavior, and from the standpoint of national security this means compromising flexibility when it comes to responding to threats. This is especially true of the U.S. adheres to such a treaty but another party does not. There are generally two kinds of treaties in this regard: a type designed to prohibit all dedicated space weapons and another designed to prohibit all destructive activities against space assets. This latter form is perhaps the most likely of the two to be pursued, as it is more verifiable and also includes the mitigation of orbital debris. Still, treaties are the "toughest rules" to implement, according to Krepon, and are very difficult to negotiate not just on the international level but also at the level of national ratification.

Instead, Krepon suggests a code of conduct, which is a flexible tool that can be implemented more quickly than a treaty and is less formal. In addition, other codes of conduct, such as those used by military services, aviators and sailors, can inform a space code of conduct. A code, for example, can include mechanisms for confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to remove misunderstandings and unilateral decisions by States. It can also include orbital debris mitigation guidelines, such as those already endorsed by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Krepon suggested such a code could be endorsed by a space power like the United States via an Executive Decision by the President, but that such a move has questionable legal relevance (laws are not made by the Executive Branch, but rather the Legislative Branch, the Congress). It is possible, however, for Executive Decisions to be made into law by a simple majority in both houses of Congress. Still, it is an option to consider, and one that is not entirely unreasonable given President Barack Obama's campaign promise to pursue a comprehensive space policy that generically supports a "rules of the road" for space.

Secure World Foundation thanks Mr. Krepon for taking time out of his busy schedule to discuss this important subject.