Natural Impact Event Interagency Planning Exercise

The U.S. Air Force Future Concepts and Transformation Division hosted a Natural Impact Event Interagency Planning Exercise on December 4, 2008, in Alexandria, Virginia. Twenty Seven Subject Matter Experts from across US Government, including the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Security Council (NSC) participated in a single day tabletop exercise to explore “whole of government” response to an impending asteroid strike. Peter Anthony Garretson (Council of Foreign Relations) and Lindley N. Johnson (Planetary Science Division, HQ NASA) also wrote a paper summarizing the findings.

The specific scenario involved a mythical asteroid, “2008 Innoculatus.” It was a binary asteroid consisting of a 270-meter rocky rubble pile projected to strike the Gulf of Guinea and a 50-meter metallic companion asteroid projected to strike in the National Capital Region (NCR). The scenario was selected to maximize exposure to the diversity of threat (variation in size, composition, land/water strike), stress both national and international notification, and provide useful pre-planning should an actual effort need to be mounted against the asteroid Apophis when it has a small probability to pass through a gravitational keyhole in 2029 and perhaps return to strike the Earth seven years later in 2036. Players were broken into two teams. The first team focused on disaster response and was told the asteroid was discovered 72 hours from impact. The second team focused on deflection/mitigation was told the asteroid had been discovered seven years from impact, and to design a “strawman” deflection plan using existing capabilities. Major findings include:

- The NEO impact scenario is not captured in existing plans
- The NEO impact scenario should be elevated to higher level exercises with more senior players
- Proper planning and response to a NEO emergency requires delineation of organizational responsibilities including lead agency and notification standards,
- Players were not able to achieve consensus on which agency should lead the NEO deflection/mitigation effort
- There is a deficit in software tools to support senior decision-making and strategic communication for disaster response and mitigation for a NEO scenario
- There are significant effects a NEO impact would generate that are not adequately captured in existing models
- The public may be aware of an impending NEO impact before senior decision-makers
- Lead time for evacuation requires decisions be made before best information is available
- Public safety and tranquility require that the federal government be able to rapidly establish a single authoritative voice and tools to present critical information
- The preferred approach for short-notice NEO deflection was stand-off nuclear

Space Weather and Space Junk: Hazards to Satellite Operations

Satellites have a lot to dodge these days. Natural hazards, like coronal mass ejections from the Sun, intense radiation, and micrometeoroids – these are part of the natural environment of Earth orbit – what is called space weather.

Add to that mix, human-made hazards, ranging from lost bolts to drifting satellites – labeled as orbital debris, but better known as space junk.

This week space weather experts have gathered for the 2009 Space Weather Workshop, held April 28-May 1 in Boulder, Colorado, a meeting of science, research, applications, operations, and users. The event is sponsored by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Space Weather Prediction Center.

The conference addresses the remarkably diverse impacts of space weather on today’s technology, from communications, navigation, spacecraft operations and aviation to a nation’s electric power grid.

International Civil Space Situational Awareness
Dr. Suzanne Metlay, Operations Director of Secure World Foundation (SWF), presented April 28 at the meeting "Space Weather and International Civil Space Situational Awareness".

Metlay wrapped up a session at the workshop dedicated to Space Weather and Satellite Operations, addressing how space weather is a key aspect of a proposed system for international civil space situational awareness (ICSSA) that would help track objects in low Earth orbit, along with positional data and point of contact information.

Space situational awareness involves knowledge of where a satellite is at any given moment, what other objects are around it, and its space environment.

Metlay explained that ICSSA is vital to avoid incidents like last month when the crew of the International Space Station had to hide from a fragment of orbital debris (luckily the crew and the orbiting facility weren't hit) or as in February when two satellites collided in low Earth orbit, completely destroying both satellites.

Metlay added: "The economic consequences of inadequate SSA data collection, poor data sharing, or lack of international coordination can be significant to civil, military and commercial satellite operators."

Key to success
Space weather events such as solar flares can shorten the life expectancy of operating satellites. Ground stations that track the satellites may also suffer if navigational data such as Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite signals are corrupted, leading to signal timing and position errors. The effects of ionization in Earth’s atmosphere leading to communications data scatter, interruption or loss are well documented.

Metlay emphasized that “space weather factors are crucial to address when developing an ICSSA program and expertise in space weather is key to its success”.

Secure World Foundation (SWF) encourages the development of an international civil SSA program that includes space weather considerations. Governance, security and user-oriented issues must be addressed as well as a comprehensive scheme for funding and operating the system.

In a wide-ranging review of current concerns, SWF Technical Consultant, Brian Weeden, concludes:

"Such an international civil space situational awareness system is not a dream. All of the essential technical elements exist and there is a demonstrated need. What is lacking is the political will on behalf of both private industry and States to come together and create what is truly needed."

Space Weather Workshop - SWF Operations Director Suzanne Metlay presents on Space Weather and SSA

Dr. Suzanne Metlay, Operations Director for Secure World Foundation ended the first day of the Space Weather Workshop with a talk entitled "Space Weather and International Space Situational Awareness." She began her talk by defining SSA and highlighting the need for it by citing the the Iridium 33-Cosmos 2251 collision earlier in the year.

Metlay then described how SSA serves as the foundation for debris mitigation, debris removal and space traffic management. The idea is to provide all space actors access to the tools needed for safe and sustainable used of outer space. She then went on to differentiate civil SSA from military SSA by describing civil SSA as more focused on positional data whereas military SSA requires much more data such as mission objectives and the nature of sensors or transponders.

Metlay pointed out that SSA data is collected by the DoD (via the Space Surveillance Network), the International Scientific Optical Observation Network (ISON) and other sources, which can then be filtered through a data clearing house for owner-operators. On such system is called SOCRATES-GEO (an example of processing and standardizing raw data on GEO satellites for owner-operators, provided by the Center for Space Standards and Innovation). The idea, ultimately, is to eventually produce a SOCRATES-type system for all Earth orbital regimes (a central data center, for example).

Space Weather Workshop - Space Weather and Satellite Operations

Today's afternoon session focuses on space weather and satellite operations, beginning with a presentation by Michael Bodeau of Northrup Grumman on the matter of deep charging among GEO satellites. Jeff Cassidy of Global Aerospace followed with a discussion on satellite insurance. Cassidy first described the satellite insurance industry; the industry is worldwide with risks typically shared among many insurers. Worldwide premium ranged from $600 million to $1 billion peer year. Satellite insurance is considered "catastrophic" by the insurance sector, and coverage is broken into launch phase, post-separation through end of in-orbit testing (IOT) and in-orbit.

Cassidy then discussed the satellite anomaly database, which contains information on 562 satellites through 2002. Data is collected from public sector and two decades of satellite health reports. The data collection process ceased in 2002 due to ITAR concerns, and a scrubbed version was made available to the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC). However, the data is limited and therefore statistical validity is an issue. The database is generally used for evaluating failure history for insurance underwriting and is focused on measuring percentage of loss capacity; data includes satellite name, date of anomaly, manufacturer, model, affected subsystem, etc. Ten percent of anomalies result in loss of capacity, mostly due to power subsystem issues. Findings include: 1) Payload electrical power systems are drivers for loss of capacity, 2) most serious anomalies are in the subsystems, 3) anecdotal evidence of periodic recurrence of certain types of anomalies, and 4) potential exists to overlay anomaly data with space environmental data.

Orbital debris was also discussed in the context of insurance briefly; the risk is very small, but there is concern that the number of impact from debris is increasing. Still, from Cassidy's perspective, launch is issue number one, with mission operations second. Orbital debris is considered a third priority.

An article in Aviation Week & Space Technology (April 13, 2009, page 38-39) also addresses insurance issues related to orbital debris. The article states that "premiums have outstripped claims for six of the past seven years and are expected to do so again this year. This has kept insurer margins high, as the five-year cumulative gross margin indicates, and attracted plenty of capacity, keeping rates low." The insurance industry finished 2008 with $930 million in gross premiums and claims of less than $320 million. Orbital debris is considered a growing problem, as Cassidy indicated, with about $1 billion worth of insured satellites in LEO (particularly between 500-1,000 kilometers). GEO is also a worrisome issue, with the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) pointing out that there are 94 "rogue drifter satellites" in the active GEO belt. There is little in terms of a legal context to help owner/operators identify satellites or debris when it comes to insurance claims and assign liability. Third-party liability, according to the AW&ST article, "is available for damage caused by a third party in the course of routine launch and satellite orbital operations." Still, there are very few satellites that have this kind of coverage. While the risk of damage caused by orbital debris is less that of launch failure or subsystem failure, "more accurate data" about the space environment (i.e., civil space situational awareness) is cited as a requirement to address this growing problem.

Dave Chenette of Lockheed Martin presented on the importance of space weather to satellite operations. His talk focused mainly on how Lockheed depends on short-term forecasts and near real time space weather measurements. A discussion on how models are applied with these data to plan and execute on-orbit operations followed. Chenette emphasized the need for real-time space weather data, from launch to satellite operations. In short, short-term space weather prediction models are required for mission planning, combined with real-time knowledge to support SSA and inform anomaly response. Models currently being used include the Relativistic Electron Forecast Model (for GEO) and the Costello Geomagnetic Activity Index.

Space Weather Workshop - Air Force Weather

Dr. Fred Lewis of Air Force Weather presented on the subjects of space situational awareness, space weather impacts, the AF space weather roadmap and the way ahead for the Air Force on these matters. There has been significant cooperation with several agencies on space-based space weather sensors (AF Space Command and AF/A30-S/W). Lewis went on to describe the space weather information flow, especially as this supports the warfighter in the field. He also described how space weather impacts the warfighter.

According to Lewis, space-based weather sensors are on-track with AFSPC to have ACE up by 2016-2018. Current ground-based sensors need upgrades or replacement (ionosphere and solar observing), but status is pending on how to deal with this. The objective, however, is to field much higher resolution sensors. Space environment models, working with NASA, AFRL, NRL, NSF and others is under way, using actual data to develop impact calculations. Lewis did say there is progress on NPOESS regarding the lost sensors, but did not go into detail on this dubious program.

In sum, efforts are ramping up in anticipation of the solar maximum sometime in 2013.

Space Weather Workshop - Aviation and space weather

Robert Maxson (NOAA/NWS/Aviation Weather Center) presented first during the Space Weather Workshop being held in Boulder, Colorado this week. Of particular interest to Secure World Foundation was his brief comment on the reliability of GPS for air navigation during peak solar radiation periods. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in partnership with several other agencies, is working to make GPS the primary navigation input for air traffic control by about 2035 or so. However, a ground infrastructure will remain as supplemental navigation system. Also discussed was radiation hazards for aircrews and passengers. Polar flights (discussed later) are expected to increase in coming years, presenting new problems since the radiation exposure in polar regions is double that of a flight at the same altitude at the equator.

Cecilia Miner (NOAA/NWS/Aviation Services) also reiterated the GPS issue within the context of the Next Generation Air Transportation System. This system will include an integrated and nationally consistent common weather picture for observation and navigation; a net-centric capability to facilitate communication and provide a virtual repository of data; and direct integration of weather (including space weather) information into operational decision-making process. These will be manifested in something called a 4-Dimensional Weather Cube (three volume dimensions plus time). Initial operational capability of the 4D Cube is expected in 2013. Immediate capability planned for 2016, with full operational capability in 2022. Fielding of the Next Generation Air Transportation System is planned for 2025 - with primary GPS air traffic navigation in place by 2032-2035. The FAA is also dealing with integration of air traffic control (ATC) and space traffic management, pursued because of the expected increase in commercial suborbital flights. This, however, was not discussed during Miner's talk.

The bottom line is that GPS and space weather will be integral components of the next generation air traffic management system. These will also play a crucial role in space traffic management, together with space situational awareness and orbital debris characterization. It is important to note, however, that STM has not yet been defined in any way; rather, it is evident what sorts of information will be required for safe and sustainable operations in space.

Bryn Jones of SolarMetrics presented on the general subject of space weather requirements, with emphasis on activities to address this issue via the Cross Polar Working Group. The CPWG provides a forum to improve air traffic services for aircraft transitioning polar and Russian Far East airspace and includes representatives from Russia, Canada, Iceland, U.S. (FAA), the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC), among others. Bottom line here is the desire to have real-time radiation exposure data fed to aircrews while inflight. Note also that communications during portions of polar flights cannot be reliably supported by satellites in GEO; instead, HF is used in daylight or ground infrastructure is used when aircraft are not in the GEO satellites' line of sight. GPS signals are also apparently not always accurate on parts of polar routes.

Mike Stills of United Airlines discussed polar aviation operations and space weather. According to Stills, there were only 368 transpolar flights in 2000. In 2008, this ballooned to 7,999 such flights (United flies most of these polar flights). He highlighted the problems of intense space weather outbreaks on polar air operations and what sorts of processes can help mitigate the impact of hazardous space weather. Polar operations are defined as flights conducted above 78N latitude. Commercial polar fights are not conducted above 78S. Challenges include space weather, colder temperatures, lack of diversion services (not many emergency options in terms of landing sites) and communications.

Ian Getley of Quantas Airlines presented next on the "Evaluation of New Cosmic Radiation Monitors Designed for Aircrew Exposure Assessment." Following his talk was one delivered by Matthias Meier of the German Aerospace Center, who spoke on the subject of dose rate measurements at aviation altitudes during the past solar minimum (March 2006 to August 2008). Closing out thee morning session was Chris Mertens of NASA Langley, who presented on "NAIRAS Prediction of Aircraft Radiation Exposure During a High-energy Solar Energetic Particle Event in October 2003." Though interesting, no details of these talks are provided here since their relationship to SWF agenda items is not immediately apparent.

Better Data Needed To Enhance Civil and Commercial Spaceflight

Secure World Foundation called today for improvements in satellite situational awareness for all that use the global commons of outer space to carry out a wide variety of services and to further scientific knowledge.

The Foundation believes that the long term sustainability of outer space activities will in time require a broad international approach to space situational awareness.

This call to action has been recently highlighted due to collisions between objects in orbit – events that not only lead to potential disruptions in services but also leave debris in orbit. This debris raises the economic costs of future operations in space by increasing the measures satellite operators must take to protect their assets.

This issue and key recommendations by Secure World Foundation were submitted today in a written statement before the House Committee on Science and Technology’s Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics.

The hearing before the subcommittee focused on "Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial Users".

Unavoidable first step
In order to continue to reap the substantial benefits provided by activities in Earth orbit, the United States will need to find a satisfactory way to enhance space situational awareness.

In its written statement, Secure World Foundation noted that:

"If we desire to continue to reap the immense benefits that space can provide, we must take steps to preserve the Earth’s orbital environment. A key concern is the threat of loss of utility of key orbits because of a proliferation of space debris. The unavoidable first step to this preservation is to determine what is in Earth orbit and where it is going: space situational awareness (SSA)."

For U.S. strategic, commercial, civil and scientific objectives, improved SSA of all parties is essential to ensure the viability of U.S. interests in space in the long-term.

Access to SSA information, along with the capacity to interpret it for all space actors - both emerging and developed -- can significantly enhance the safety of U.S. space assets. Improved operational practices through SSA will hopefully help to prevent future collisions and other debris causing incidents.

However, as noted in Secure World Foundation’s statement: "Unfortunately, most actors in space do not have the resources or capacity to provide their own space situational awareness information necessary to make safe and secure decisions regarding activities in space. The few States that do have the resources to provide this information are often limited by national security or military restrictions from sharing it with other actors."

Significant limitations
The United States military currently has the world’s best SSA network. Still, this network has significant limitations as a result of the lack of coverage in areas where the United States does not have a presence.

Secure World Foundation points out that, from an organizational perspective, this network does not currently have the financial resources, capacity or requirement to provide the necessary SSA data and resources for civil and commercial purposes globally.

While upgrades to this network are planned and underway by the U.S. military they are subject to fiscal constraints that may cause delays or reductions in desired capabilities.

In its written statement, Secure World Foundation observes that the United States is not alone in its capacity to provide SSA data. Many other States possess a limited SSA capability, usually not more than a few radar or optical telescopes.

Taken separately, these sensors only provide spot coverage and very limited capacity. However, if the data from these existing sensors were combined, they would provide a large fraction of the capabilities necessary for global coverage.

International data sharing
Thus, Secure World Foundation feels that some level of international data sharing would increase SSA capacity without the expense of building additional sensors.

"In addition to global sensor coverage, SSA must include data from commercial satellite owner-operators, as they have positional data on their satellites that is more accurate than any ground-based sensor could obtain," SWF's statement explains.

"These commercial operators have very precise information about the locations of their own satellites, but little to no information about other satellites, dead satellites and other pieces of debris that float through their slots. Their positional data complements the ground-based tracking of debris and also reduces the workload requirements for the tracking networks, freeing up capacity to focus on inactive satellites and debris."

Key points raised in SWF’s written statement:

• SSA is vital to the continued long term use and sustainability of Earth orbit.
• There are civil and commercial requirements and uses for SSA data. The U.S. military currently does not have the resources to provide this service.
• An SSA system needs to combine multiple data sources, including ground and space-based sensors, satellite owner-operators, and space weather data.
• While some elements of the SSA system can and should be done unilaterally, there are multiple options for international participation and engagement.
• The key benefit to international participation in SSA is greater capability for relatively low cost, by combining existing sensors and data sources.

Blogs of note

For those interested on what's going on at the 1st IAA Planetary Defence Conference in Granada, Spain, this live blog is provided.

A new Office of Science Technology Policy (OSTP) blog has been created, a place where you can learn about and have real input into the policymaking process as it relates to science and technology.

Planetary Defense Conference: Protecting Earth from Asteroids, Comets

World experts are gathering this week to assess methods, including political, legal and policy issues, to protect our planet from impacts by asteroids and comets. Image: Phil Smith, courtesy of SpaceWorks Engineering, Inc.

Today, there are some 900 asteroids and comets that are designated Potentially Hazardous Objects - objects large enough that could eventually threaten Earth. Evidence is building that impacts by asteroids and comets are not uncommon. Indeed, relatively small objects can cause local and regional disasters.

The meeting of worldwide authorities April 27-30 in Granada, Spain signals the first International Academy of Astronautics Planetary Defense Conference that will detail the safeguarding of Earth from asteroids.

"The Planetary Defense Conference is the premier international venue for sharing scientific research on Near Earth Objects (NEOs) and to examine possible mitigation strategies for those objects that may threaten Earth’s inhabitants," said Dr. Ray Williamson, Executive Director of the Secure World Foundation.

Secure World Foundation (SWF) is pleased to be able to co-sponsor this important four-day conference.

"Because a NEO strike is an international problem, mitigating NEOs will require international decision making and international action, and this conference provides much of the information needed to take action," Williamson said.

Williamson, along with Brian Weeden, SWF’s technical consultant, will present at the conference: The NEO Primer: A Tool for Collaboration, Communication, and Outreach.

Deflecting a threatening object
This week’s conference will feature expert discussion of various topics, to help broaden the knowledge base and increase the range of scientific disciplines involved in planetary defense, such as:

* Detecting and tracking asteroids and comets that might be hazardous to our planet,
* Characteristics of these objects,
* Deflecting a threatening object should one be detected,
* The nature of impact disasters, and political, legal and policy issues that must be considered as part of an overall mitigation strategy.

"This meeting will provide attendees with the current state-of-the-art in planetary defense," said Dr. William Ailor, co-chair of the conference and an employee of The Aerospace Corporation. He is also a member of SWF's Advisory Committee.

"Experts from all over the world will share their knowledge on asteroids and comets, on techniques that could be used to deflect a threatening object," Ailor added, "and on political and policy issues that could affect our decision to mount a defensive effort."

Recent discoveries
Ailor said that as more sophisticated tools are used, "we are finding evidence that humanity has been affected by past impacts."

As example, Ailor observed that recent discoveries point to an asteroid impact in the Atlantic Ocean some 2,300 years ago as possible cause for a tsunami that washed up the Hudson River at that time.

And, while it hit in a remote area, an explosion linked to entry of an asteroid or comet leveled over 500 square miles of trees - an area larger than Washington, D.C. - in Siberia in 1908. Recently, an object of approximately the same size passed very close to our planet, Ailor said.

"It's just a matter of time until we will need to take some action to avoid a potential disaster," Ailor pointed out.

"We are gradually increasing public awareness and appreciation for the threat posed by these Near Earth Objects," Ailor said, but we are still early in our ability to mount a deflection campaign. We have techniques that can be used, but we can’t simply use a Space Shuttle to do the work, he said.

"We must act on a threatening object very far from Earth, so mounting a campaign will not be easy. This week's conference will highlight promising concepts to enhance our readiness for action," Ailor concluded.

For additional information on the International Academy of Astronautics Planetary Defense Conference, go here.

NEO CONFERENCE - International/domestic law and NEOs

The morning sessions of the second day of the NEO Conference being held at the University of Nebraska Lincoln focused on legal issues related to NEOs.

Dr. Maureen Williams (Professor of International Law at the University of Buenos Aires), Dr. Frans von der Dunk (Professor of Space Law at the University of Nebraska Lincoln) and Leslie Tennen (Attorney at Law for Sterns & Tennen) each described legal concerns from the international perspective. Among the more interesting subjects discussed was the international legal considerations of private-public interaction of dealing with NEOs. For example, how might private entities dedicated to mining asteroid resources work with governmental agencies or the UN when it comes to NEO detection and deflection requirements.

Joanne Gabrynowicz (Director of the National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and Space Law at the University of Mississippi) followed with a talk on US domestic law and regulation relevant to exploiting NEOs, especially focusing on the current state of the law. Areas within the space industry that serve as important inputs to NEO legal considerations include launch, remote sensing and tourism markets, which all require some sort of licensing regime (FAA for commercial launch and suborbital vehicles, and NOAA for commercial remote sensing). NEO regulation, which does not exist currently, will be informed by these other industries, at least at the beginning.

Gabrynowicz also pointed out the importance of looking to international law to inform how the US might deal with NEO regulation. She also discussed liability, a major issue related to insurance, for example. There is much that already exists in terms of US tort law that can be used as a basis for figuring out how liability might be applied to NEO regulation, which applies especially if a NEO deflection effort fails. In her discussion, she pointed out that in the legal community, "commercial" and "private" are not interchangeable, and that contracts will need to be very precise in terms of apportionment, joint and several liability, and indemnification, among other things. Definitions on nature of the risk will also need to be clearly defined; is NEO deflection an "ultra-hazardous" activity, for example? Informing the answer to this question is the fact that NEO deflection is an "uncommon activity."

Government contractor defense was also discussed as an issue of importance in NEO regulation; that is, if a contractor follows the letter of a contract and something goes wrong, they are not liable, the government is. Malfeasance, misconduct, or any criminal act are exceptions, of course. Gabrynowicz pointed out that there is no defined minimum care owed under "best efforts" standards when it comes to NEO detection and deflection. Other issues highlighted: Can government space operations using nuclear material be enjoined? The US is not liable for on-duty injury of military negligence of others in the armed forces - will this be an issue in NEO regulation? The US Government is also strictly liable for harm caused by defective raw data - something definitely an issue when it comes to NEO detection. Can individuals or companies claim celestial bodies (the US State Department says no, according to at least one official statement)? Does the "Good Samaritan" doctrine apply? Is US mining law relevant when it comes to NEO regulation? What of environmental law, military-civilian cooperation, humanitarian legal obligations, US Government responsibility regarding public health and safety, and national jurisdiction relative to legal commons? Much work clearly remains beyond the significant technical challenges.

NEO CONFERENCE - Analysis of proposed NEO mitigation methods

Agnieszcka Lukaszczyk presented on the subject of "Move On Asteroid 2008 Competition" sponsored by the Space Generation Advisory Council (SGAC). Lukaszczyk was an Executive Officer of SGAC before working for SWF as a Space Policy Consultant, but continues too represent SGAC at various functions.

Lukaszczyk focused on the legal and policy implications of the technical entries to the Move On Asteroid 2008 Competition. In order to do this, a Legal Degree of Difficulty (LD2) was developed, a metric from 1 to 5, with 5 being very difficult to implement from a legal standpoint. A Lincoln Scale was also developed, focusing on the public willingness to support a given mitigation solution (1 to 100, with 100 being total support). Lukaszczyk also introduced the Move on Asteroid 2009 Competition.

SGAC also pursues surveys conducted on a regular basis. Its surveys, conducted via Internet, reveal a bias toward industrialized nations with Internet access, with over half of the respondents considering themselves space professionals. Most surveyed know what NEOs are, and most are concerned about NEOs.The surveys also reveal that about two out of three respondents believe the NEO threat to be "Medium." Again, most know that there are many options being considered for detecting and deflecting NEOs, with the overwhelming majority having a desire to actively remove a NEO threat. Finally, about 75 percent of respondents knew that there was no international regime for handling NEOs, with the majority of the total pool believing that NEOs are a global problem requiring international cooperation.

Dr. Lou Friedman, Executive Director of The Planetary Society, mentioned that a recent poll conducted by his organization revealed a very strong interest aomng members in dealing with NEOs. Apparently, such strong interest was not apparent in past polling.

Ben Baseley-Walker, SWF Law and Policy Consultant, discussed different institutional models for NEO response, including key questions like organizational proliferation (strong move in political community to counter this proliferation) and legitimacy (concern for credibility and relevance, a special challenge for NEO-related mitigation efforts). Other issues regarding how the international community should deal with the NEO threat involve "majority rule" or consensus, approaches which have strengths and weakness and becomes more an issue of appropriateness of application.

Baseley-Walker also highlighted the need for "branding" the NEO threat problem; that this is a crisis situation in which those who decide to deal with the crisis will not be technical experts but will instead by politicians. This means the NEO threat community will need to be well-versed on matters of politics and diplomatic sensitivities. Key political questions include: What if mitigation effort goes awry? Will the effort result in armed conflict? If a key State is on a collision course, do we run the risk of unilateral action being taken? Should the matter be handled by the UN or some other organizational structure? Baseley-walker also suggests that the international humanitarian law arena might provide insight on such matters.

Finally, Baseley-Walker generally assessed the ASE NEO Report recommendations in terms of international policy challenges, including definition of "space-faring States," consensus versus majority decision-making and mitigation sensitivities (such as use of nuclear detonators), among other concerns.

Bottom line, according to Baseley-Walker, "How do you make the NEO issue relevant?" This is an especially salient point during a time of global economic and political difficulty.

NEO CONFERENCE - Legal, policy and institutional aspects of NEO threat mitigation

Dr. Lou Friedman, Executive Director of The Planetary Society, moderated a panel entitled "Legal, Policy and Institutional Aspects of NEO Threat Mitigation." The panel featured Dr. Ray Williamson (SWF Executive Director), Ben Baseley-Walker (SWF Legal and Policy Consultant), Agnieszka Lukaszczyk (SWF Space Policy Consultant) and Walther Lichem (former Austrian ambassador).

Ambassador Lichem spoke on the subject of legal and institutional implications of asteroid threat mitigation operations policy, specifically on responsibilities and liabilities. Lichem pointed out that the UN Charter should be seen as the "constitutional cornerstone" when thinking about matters related to space governance; that is, it is the source of key principles that can inform the approach to space security issues like NEO threat mitigation. He also highlighted how national space policies and actions are actually multilateral concerns, that space security matters like NEO detection and deflection are necessarily global concerns. Instruments like the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention, to name a few, are a step below the UN Charter in terms of abstraction, providing structure and process to space security while also providing cooperative regimes. Such cooperation help facilitate work on other space security priorities like NEO threat mitigation.

Regarding NEO threats, States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty, under Article 11, are required "to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively." This means that the US, for example, must share any data regarding NEO threats to the best of its ability. However, how this is done remains unclear, and indeed the ASE Report provides general recommendations on how to institutionalize this process. In addition, UN Charter Article 52 preserves a State's right to self defense, which includes NEO threat mitigation. Again, cooperation on this matter is critical. In the end, Lichem advocates the principle of the responsibility to protect - States have a fundamental responsibility to protect the fundamental right to life, and this includes threats posed by NEOs. If a States cannot provide this protect, the international community has a subordinate responsibility to fill this gap, and thus the NEO threat requires global cooperation.

Dr. Williamson discussed the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in NEO threat mitigation. Williamson was reminded by Lichem that NGOs played a key role in revolutions in international cooperation. This served in setting the tone for how to think about NGOs and their role in NEO detection and deflection. Following a description of what an NGO is (a legally established organization with no participation or representation in government), Williamson explained that NGOs fill niches not explored by governments, and that they can do so without the limitations often imposed by governmental policy or regulation. NGOs serve as a voice of citizens and organizations, and attempt to influence policies on the domestic or international level. Typically, NGOs influence according to two diplomatic tracks: Track 1 diplomacy is government to government, whereas Track 2 diplomacy is within the NGO community.

Indeed, the NEO conference taking place today counts six NGOs among those participating, working in partnership with corporate and government representatives. These include SWF, the International Academy of Astronautics, the Association of Space Explorers, The Planetary Society, the International Law Association and the International Astronautical Federation. Williamson wondered if perhaps a Track 3 diplomacy might be necessary, one in which NGOs work with government representatives directly.

One audience member asked if all NGOs are non-profit organizations (NPOs) - it was generally agreed that this is understood. Lichem pointed out that the agenda of an NGO is by definition focused on the common good, and a for-profit agenda can be contrary to this objective. NGOs serve a general interface role between civil society and governmental structures.

NEO CONFERENCE - COPUOS Action Team-14 status

Dr. Sergio Camacho, Secretary General of the Regional Centre for Space Science and Technology Education for Latin America and the Caribbean (CRECTEALC) presented on the subject of Action Team-14, a group established within the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) for purposes of addressing the NEO threat.

Dr. Camacho described how the UN, COPUOS, and Action Team-14 functions, particularly how matters related to the NEO threat will likely be addressed within the UN bureaucracy.

The NEO issue became a UN matter in 1999 with the adoption of UNISPACE III recommendations. COPUOS then looked for a mechanism to address the matter, and after a year of discussion, in 2001, formed Action Team-14 within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS (though at the time, "Action Team" was not the official designation). Thirty-three recommendations from UNISPACE III, it turns out, ultimately served as the impetus for the establishment of several action teams.

Action Team-14 followed its work according to two phases: an Assessment Phase and an Implementation Phase. In the Assessment Phase, Action Team-14 assessed existing intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) capable of addressing the NEO threat. An interim report was submitted to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee during its 2009 Session, where, in fact, the NEO Report recommendations by the Association of Space Explorers mentioned earlier in today's conference were presented. In fact, the ASE Report was identified as an ideal foundation for further work. Among other things, the Action Team-14 interim report also included NASA's new objective to scan the skies for NEOs by 2020. In the end, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee formally endorsed the work being conducted by Action Team-14, a critical step in insuring that further international coordination on NEOs continues.

Action Team-14 will develop draft recommendations for the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on the international response to the NEO threat by 2010. If endorsed by the Subcommittee, the recommendations pass on for consideration by COPUOS. If COPUOS endorses the recommendations, they move on to the UN General Assembly for consideration.

Dr. Adigun Ade Abiodun of Nigeria (UN Expert on Space Applications) asked about the role of the COPUOS Legal Subcommittee role in this regard; that is, would the work of Action Team-14 need to go through the Legal Subcommittee in addition to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee before being formally presented to COPUOS? Dr. Camacho indicated this is not necessarily the case. In point of fact, the Legal Subcommittee has not worked on the NEO matter in any substantial way, at least not yet. The concern is that because of this situation, coordination is necessary. It was also asked if the orbital debris mitigation efforts being undertaken my both subcommittees is a model. Dr. Camacho indicated that this would not be a good template, mainly because there was much opposition to including mitigation of orbital debris as an agenda item, whereas the NEO threat is largely supported. Further, Dr. Ray Williamson (SWF Executive Director) pointed out that in the orbital debris instance, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) is a different sort of NGO than ASE, whose report is being considered the foundation for further NEO work. In the former case, the IADC proposed voluntary guidelines were formally adopted by COPUOS in 2007. Finally, Rusty Schweickart pointed out that the IADC guidelines are much more specific that the recommendations presented int he ASE Report, meaning the NEO effort is not as controversial.

The Implementation Phase, of course, remains as a future objective.

NEO CONFERENCE - International Academy of Astronautics

Dr. Jean-Michel Contant, Secretary General of the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA), founded in 1960 by Dr. Theodore von Kármán, presented the IAA Report on NEO detection, tracking and deflection, completed in December 2008.

The report describes the technological challenges and requirements for detection and tracking of NEOs, identifying technologies that can be used for detection and deflection, assessments of the risks (response depends on threat) and the need for a globally coordinated response plan. Details on how to establish the latter, however, remains undefined.

The role of IAA vis-a-vis NEOs is to promulgate comprehensive, accurate information about the NEO threat and sponsor international workshops to examine any or all technical, social, or policy aspects of NEO problem, among other things.

NEO CONFERENCE: The NEO Report from Association of Space Explorers

Dr. Tom Jones presented a talk entitled "The Association of Space Explorers (ASE) NEO Report and Onwards." Discussion included origins of the report, details on the workshops, coordination with the UN and other related matters.

Tom introduced his talk by asking the question on why work on NEO detection and deflection is necessary. He referred back to Rusty's talk, but also elaborated on the challenge of managing the flood of expected NEO discoveries and the likelihood of decisions required for detection and deflection. Also, there is a need for a "Mission Rules" paradigm to ensure that decisions made regarding NEO detection, tracking and deflection are made efficiently and effectively.

There is a need for global response to NEOs, but the challenges are not trivial. Examples include: The coming "avalanche" of discoveries of potentially hazardous NEOs is expected, space technology is such that detection and deflection is possible, deflection techniques shift risks to different populations, planning takes decades, decision frequency much higher than impact frequency, decision often required before impact confidence is high, and lack of planning risks delay, panic and missed opportunities.

ASE established a NEO committee following Rusty Schweickart's recommendation. ASE's observer status at the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) provided a window to introduce and elaborate the NEO problem to the international community via a legitimate and credible mechanism. ASE also has membership on Action Team-14, a working group within the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee dedicated to NEOs. The Secure World Foundation also has observer status at COPUOS as well as membership on Action Team-14, and is a key partner with ASE on the matter of NEOs.

ASE sponsored a series of workshops bringing together experts in NEOs across the board, from technology, science and policy. These workshops culminated in the authorship of a report, which was subsequently formally presented to COPUOS in February 2009. The year is now dedicated to making stakeholders, decision-makers and the public aware of the report's conclusions and recommendations. There are, however, many outstanding issues that require resolution.

The report essentially recommends that the United nations Security Council establish a functional system to address NEOs, rather than establishing new facilities and a new bureaucracy. A Mission Authorization and Oversight Council (MAOC) would have UN oversight, address policy issues and manage the two functions under its oversight authority. These two functions include the Information Analysis and Warning Network (IAWN) and the Mission Planning and Operations Group (MPOC). The IAWN would handle detection, tracking and warning, whereas the MPOC would focus on deflection, guided by a Mission Plan already established in order to increase decision-making time and effectiveness of response.

Costs involved are considered extremely moderate, especially when the costs of doing nothing could be catastrophic.

Current status is that recently widely observed and reported NEO events have increased awareness, and ASE successfully presented the NEO report, in partnership with SWF, to COPUOS earlier in the year. A campaign to have COPUOS formally adopt the recommendations of the report is the current effort, with ASE, the B612 Foundation, and COPUOS Action Team-14 continuing to work on NEO issues indefinitely.

In sum, according to Rusty Schweickart, "We are driving around the Solar System without insurance."

NEO CONFERENCE - Rusty Schweickart

Rusty Schweickart, founder of the B612 Foundation and member of the Association of Space Explorers (ASE), introduced the problem of near Earth objects, focusing his talk mainly on what they are and how we might respond to them from a technological point of view. He concluded his presentation by also introducing the geopolitical issues involved. ASE, whose membership is limited to those who have actually traveled into space, focuses on the geopolitical, legal and decision-making issues related to NEOs. The B612 Foundation, meanwhile, focuses on the technologies related to NEO deflection.

Rusty described the number and distribution of NEOs. There are about 100,000 NEOs greater that 140 meters, and about 1,000 NEOs greater than one kilometer. These are statistical derivations, but close to actual observations - observations suggest that the statistical numbers are higher than actual. So far, NASA's Spaceguard has discovered about 82 percent of the latter group of NEOs (one km or larger). NASA has recently been directed to identify 90 percent of NEOs 140 meters and larger by 2020. It will probably not be able to make this goal due to various issues, but the effort is still important because it will contribute greatly to the database. Still, it is important to realize that 40-45 meter objects make major impact events, but telescopes are not capable of finding most of these until it is too late. There are about 1 million such objects and are not easily tracked. Tunguska was about 3-5 megatons, and fit into this category of "small" NEOs. Such an impact could devastate a large modern city.

There are three issues to address when it comes to NEOs: 1) What is out there? 2) How do we deal with the from a technological point of view, and 3) How do we decide to deal with them?

The NASA Spaceguard survey deals with #1. However, it needs to be made more robust in order to handle NEOs one kilometer and smaller. So far, there are 6,212 NEOs cataloged (as of April 22) and about 857 one kilometer and larger. Those with a non-zero probability of impact with Earth: ~246. This means that 246 NEOs may impact Earth at some point. The numbers change daily as data comes in. The survey needs to be better, and huge improvements are expected in terms of numbers by 2020 as telescopes come on line due to new NASA mandate.

The B612 Foundation and others are working on #2. Kinetic impact, or hitting the asteroid, constitutes a primary deflection capability. A gravity tractor can then "fine tune" such a deflection (secondary deflection). A nuclear missile can theoretically be used to superheat on side of a NEO that comes dangerously close to Earth in an effort to deflect the object. The secondary deflection also serves to ensure that the NEO does not pass through a "keyhole", which are gravitationally defined slots that define an orbit in which the NEO will impact Earth at some point in the future.

According to Rusty, “we currently depend on probabilities, since we do not have accurate measurements. The result is early warning is vague and uncertain.” Orbits, he said, we tend to know very well. Where the asteroid is in that orbit, however, is not always known accurately.

Finally #3 deals with the geopolitical matter of deflection decision, disaster mitigation and management. Details on this is discussed later in the conference. Questions include: How do we decide to deal with NEOs? How do we manage disasters when we miss a NEO? Which way to deflect? Who spends the money? How to ensure fast decision? These are reasons for working with the United Nations, which has existing fora to discuss these matters.

Rusty bottom lined it like this: "We currently have one eye open when it comes to detecting and tracking NEOs. The easiest thing to do is to close both eyes. It's also the cheapest. Procrastinating on a decision is tantamount to closing both eyes. Today, the effort is to open the other eye - to have both eyes open.”

Space Deterrence Concept of Increasing Relevance to Security of U.S. Space

Space is becoming ever more important to U.S. military and commercial activities. The increasing reliance of the United States on space for economic and military power has amplified the incentive for potential adversaries to exploit the inherent vulnerabilities of space assets.

As a result, analysts are revisiting deterrence concepts in a space context as one possible strategy to enhance U.S. security in this regard.

Last month, Secure World Foundation, in cooperation with the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force’s National Space Studies Center, and George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, held a workshop in Washington, D.C. That workshop brought together a core group of policy and strategic thinkers to discuss key lessons, impacts and points to bear in mind when thinking about space deterrence.

Workshop topics ranged from the analysis of deterrence as a viable strategy, to the threat to space assets and key policy aspects of deterrence.

Face of 21st century deterrence
A fundamental workshop observation is that the U.S. faces the key issue of what the face of 21st century deterrence might look like. In a post-Cold War era, the number, range, and variety of players has increased significantly, and space is perhaps the most globalized of political and military arenas. As such, there is much debate as to what the face of deterrence for space should look like, and how large a role it should play in overall US strategic thinking in protection its space assets.

"Maturing the discussion of space deterrence is important because deterrence ultimately provides the best protection of space and enhances U.S. national security," says Colonel Sean McClung, Director of the National Space Studies Center at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

McClung adds: "Successful space deterrence can prevent conflicts that create massive debris fields and result in a universal inability to effectively use the space environment."

Other events on this topic, most notably those of the National Defense University and the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, highlight the currency of this theme and its consideration by the upper echelons of political and military thinkers.

Denial deterrence
Dean Cheng, a Senior Asia Analyst with CNA, gave a critical talk on the Chinese perspective on the concept of deterrence. “Where the Western conception of deterrence is one that focuses on dissuasion and rejects a role for deterrence in coercion, the Chinese one apparently incorporates both dissuasion and coercion,” Cheng said, “thus allowing strategic goals to be achieved without actual conflict.”

Brian Weeden, Secure World Foundation’s (SWF) technical expert, discussed the use of denial deterrence to protect critical space assets from kinetic attacks.

"Normally we think of deterrence as threat of force which dissuades someone from taking an action," says Weeden. "But denial deterrence seeks to eliminate any advantage an adversary would gain from taking an action, thus removing the incentive."

The key, according to Weeden, is to replace existing constellations containing a few large satellites with constellations consisting of larger numbers of redundant smaller satellites. That way, any physical attack that destroys one or two satellites only slightly degrades the capability of the entire constellation.

Important goals
A central point of the March 19-20 workshop held at George Washington University's Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. was the response to attack on space assets.

In other domains such as air and sea, there are usually clearly delineated rules and responses to an attack. But in space, the issue is much more complex, particularly because attacks on satellites usually don’t involve direct loss of human life.

"In some situations, attacking a satellite may be the most humane option a military commander has for achieving an objective," explains John Sheldon, a professor with the School for Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell AFB.

Other participants noted both the advantage and disadvantage of having predefined "red lines" that dictate certain levels of response to aggression against space assets. As more and more actors enter the space arena, protecting U.S. space assets in the broader picture of improved U.S. national security is essential.

Important goals include:

* Constructive engagement with other space players;
* Protecting the long-term sustainability of outer space activities; and
* Preventing possible conflict escalation in the space environment.

As such, the building of an effective and coherent space deterrence concept that is relevant for modern space activities, challenges and threats should be viewed as a key building block to improved U.S. national security, SWF’s Weeden concludes.

Alternatives to a space weapons treaty

Brian Weeden, Technical Consultant to Secure World Foundation, is the author of "Alternatives to a space weapons treaty" featured in the web edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Many advocate for a comprehensive treaty prohibiting the development and fielding of space weapons, while others support a comprehensive space security strategy that addresses the same concerns in an incremental way. Weeden's article highlights the difficulties inherent in both approaches and reminds readers that there are many different ways to handle complex and often controversial space security matters.

Key points in Weeden's article include the problem of defining space weapons in part due to the dual-use nature of the technologies involved and the problem of intent, the essence of international law, and the "building block" method to establishing an international space security regime. Current international cooperation on distinct areas of space security, including civil space situational awareness, mitigation of orbital debris, detection and deflection of near Earth objects, and the use of space assets to support human and environmental security means that, in time, a comprehensive system designed to ensure the safe, secure, sustainable and peaceful uses of outer space will eventually emerge.

Experts to Discuss Dangers, Legal Issues of Thwarting Threatening Near-Earth Objects

A unique forum of experts from around the world is set to examine the dangers, prospects and legal issues of dealing with menacing Near-Earth Objects (NEOs).

The meeting, "Near-Earth Objects: Risks, Responses and Opportunities<" will take place April 23 and 24 at The University of Nebraska in Lincoln, Nebraska.

The university's College of Law is hosting the conference that will examine the legal and institutional challenges of international protocols if large asteroids or other interplanetary objects come too close to Earth for comfort.

Secure World Foundation (SWF) is a co-sponsor of the event, in conjunction with the Association of Space Explorers (ASE) and in partnership with the American Branch of the International Law Association.

"Examining how we, as an international community, develop a mechanism to make decisions on courses of action is a crucial building block in putting together an effective response to future NEO threats," said Ben Baseley-Walker, SWF's Legal and Policy Consultant.

"As a fundamentally global problem with profound potential geo-political implications should mitigation measures fail," Baseley-Walker added, "it is essential to find a consensus on an international decision-making forum and mechanism well in advance of a crisis situation involving a NEO threat."

Global framework
Near-Earth objects are an increasing area of concern among the world’s space scientists. Experts believe that over the next 15 years, advances in technology will lead to the detection of more than 500,000 NEOs – and of those, several dozen will likely pose an uncomfortably high risk of striking Earth and inflicting local or regional damage.

Taking part in the two-day program are members of a multinational committee who made recommendations last fall to the United Nations on establishing global framework to respond to NEO threats. That committee was commissioned by the ASE and chaired by former Apollo astronaut, Rusty Schweickart.

Frans von der Dunk, a leading academic in space law and professor of law at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, serves on the international NEO committee. He said that existing space technology could deflect the vast majority of threatening asteroids.

But even after a threatening object may be discovered, no mechanism exists for effective international decision-making on how to deal with a threat, Von der Dunk added.

"It's so important we establish an international framework to make decisions as early and as quickly as possible," Von der Dunk said. "It's essential so that we can take effective action [to deal with a future threat]."

Public discussion

Astronaut Schweickart will hold a public discussion about protecting the Earth from future asteroid impacts April 22 at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

The former astronaut supports the development and testing of a spaceflight concept to protect the Earth from asteroid threats. Schweickart’s talk is set for 3 p.m. at the Van Brunt Visitors Center, 313 N. 13th St. This event is free and is open to the public.

For more information on this special conference, go here.

For media wishing to attend the two-day program, contact:

Steve Smith, National News Editor
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Office of Communications
Phone: (402) 472-4226
Email: ssmith13@unl.edu

News coverage:
AstroEngine.com

North Korea's Recent Launch

What follows are some thoughts on the recent North Korean launch, authored by Secure World Foundation Director of Washington Operations Victoria Samson. A pdf version of this article can be found here. Image of North Korea's launch of Unha-2 (upper left) as seen from space courtesy of DigitalGlobe.

On April 5, North Korea launched what it claimed was a rocket bearing a satellite. Much of the rest of the world suspected that it was a ballistic missile test in disguise. While the U.S. Space Surveillance Network has reported that the North Koreans failed to place a satellite on orbit, because detailed information about the launch is not available, there is much debate over what ended up taking place. Given the technical limitations of this test and North Korea’s ballistic missile program, there is strong evidence that its primary purpose likely was to send a political message, which must be factored in when the United States and other countries respond to this test.

Last Sunday was the third time that North Korea had attempted to launch a long-range rocket, and the third time that it had failed to do so. The first was in August 1998, when the multi-stage Taepo Dong-1 was supposed to place a satellite in orbit. In shades of this week’s events, it failed in what seems to be a very similar manner: the ignition and separation of the first two stages went smoothly, but the third stage failed. Also echoing events of this week, North Korean officials claimed in 1998 that the satellite payload made it into orbit and broadcast patriotic paeans to North Korea. The second flight test and failure came in July 2006, when the first Taepo Dong-2 blew up less than a minute after it left the launch pad.

In the most recent test, the Unha-2, which is thought to be a reworked version of the Taepo Dong-2, the first stage operated apparently without incident, and fell into the Sea of Japan as planned. However, the rest of flight unraveled fairly quickly. According to publicly available data, the payload failed to separate properly from the launch vehicle, and the entire rocket ended up in the Pacific Ocean (according to Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second and third stages plummeted into the ocean very near each other: “We can't tell how much, but they are very close together”).

It should be noted that the space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles are derived from the same basic rocket technologies: in fact, many U.S. launchers were originally developed from missiles. But the differences between them arise from the goal of placing a nuclear weapons payload in a ballistic (i.e., reentering) trajectory, versus the need to place a satellite payload in orbit. Launch trajectory, size, and number of stages all play a part in distinguishing the two different uses.

North Korea did achieve a few accomplishments with this flight test. It was able to fly a multi-stage ballistic missile just around 3800 kilometers (2400 miles),which was roughly in line with what it did in 1998; furthermore, from photos released of the rocket and its launch, the Unha-2 was bigger and more powerful than the Taepo Dong-1, and potentially used more complex engine technology. This test also garnered global attention away from the G-20 summit, and gave a not-too-subtle reminder to the new Barack Obama Administration that Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq are not the United States’ only security concerns. Finally, it solidified Kim Jong Il’s standing prior to Thursday’s meeting of the North Korean parliament, where he evidently plans to have himself reappointed as head of the National Defense Commission, and reasserted his authority despite rumors that he had a stroke last August.

From a technical perspective, however, this test did not prove a good advertisement for North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile capabilities, given that all three tests have ended in failure with apparently different root causes. It also raises the question of how North Korea intended to collect critical telemetry data on the rocket performance, since it is unlikely that North Korea had ships collecting data or radar stations tracking it once it went over the horizon from the launch pad. And if North Korea had no way to monitor its missile in-flight, it implies that they are not serious about building an operational long-range ballistic missile weapon system, but instead are using their scattershot approach to ballistic missile development as way in which to garner leverage needed for international fora like the Six Party Talks (which have been stalled since last December).

Japan and the United States did the majority of the outside tracking of the launch. Two Japanese Aegis ships, the Kongo and the Chokai, were fielded in the Sea of Japan to monitor the launch. (Both of those ships were also involved in Japan’s two attempts to shoot down a target with its ship-based missile defense system: the Kongo made an intercept in December 2007, but the Chokai missed in November 2008. Still, it indicates that Japan was at least thinking about the possibility that it might have to shoot something down from the North Korean launch.) The SPY-1 radar on the Kongo detected the launch, and several U.S. Defense System Program (DSP) satellites confirmed that it had occurred. Another Japanese ship, the Kirishima, was able to track the North Korean launch from a position about 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) east of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. The Japanese were reported to have been able to track the launch until it had reached about 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) east of the Musudan-ri launch pad. It is unclear whether the Japanese forces were able to track the North Korea missile into the Pacific; it appears this was done by U.S. Aegis ships and satellites. The Sea-Based X-band radar, which has been built specifically to track North Korean missiles for the U.S. missile defense system but has only played limited roles in missile defense tests to date, was not used to follow this week’s launch; instead, it was undergoing yet more repairs.

The North Korean launch highlighted the often contradictory nature of international agreements and United Nations resolutions, which was roiled further in this case by the ambiguous wording regarding whether North Korea would be allowed to attempt space launches. For example, Pyongyang made at least a desultory effort to acknowledge existing international space law when planning this launch. It alerted the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Authority so that alerts could go out to mariners and aircraft to avoid the project splash-down areas for the first two stages and projected flight path. North Korea also officially became party to the Outer Space Treaty and Registration Convention, two important cornerstones of the peaceful uses of outer space. It reportedly even alerted Chinese, Russian and U.S. officials an hour prior to the launch. With these steps, North Korea at least paid face value to the international community before holding its launch. This acknowledgement indicates that North Korea does realize that there are international rules and regulations that must be followed and thus might be receptive to pressure in the future to be more open in meeting those rules.

Yet United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 explicitly forbids the work on ballistic missile and associated technology by North Korea. According to Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the missile launch thus "was in violation of international law." Much of this haze exists because of the similar (but not identical) nature of ballistic missile and space launch technologies. If North Korea truly had been working on a satellite launch vehicle, it could have avoided much of this suspicion by having international observers there to gather data, monitor the launch, and overall increase transparency on the issue. North Korea did not report its impending satellite launch and the broadcast frequencies it would be using to the International Telecommunication Union, which would have added weight to its assertion that a satellite was indeed being launched, not a ballistic missile.

The United Nations Security Council has taken up North Korea’s launch and is reported be close to releasing a statement that condemns it and pushes for sanctions, but nothing more than that - China and Russia are reluctant to go further.

While North Korea should not be allowed to disregard international measures of censure like United Nations Security Council statements, individual nations must not overreact to this latest launch. With a track record of zero for three spread out over a decade, and lacking serious re-entry vehicle and warhead testing, North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile program does not present an immediate threat. Nevertheless, it should certainly be closely monitored, and policy-makers should take that into consideration when deciding funding priorities during the upcoming budget debates. The United States and other countries should use this as an opportunity to put the Six Party Talks back on track, not as justification for increased spending on weapon systems that are of little use in strengthening overall national security.

Update on North Korean launch

It appears that the North Korean launch may have been an attempt to place a satellite into orbit, but the effort has failed. The first and second stages of the vehicle apparently operated successfully, but the third stage did not, meaning the payload fell into the Pacific Ocean.

This is a similar outcome to a Taepodong-1 launch performed in 1998, which North Korea claims was a successful attempt to place a satellite into orbit. Western sources never confirmed this, and it is widely believed the launch failed. A Taepodong-2 launch was executed in 2006, and in this case the vehicle failed within a minute after first stage ignition.

The issue now is how the UN Security Council will react to the launch. The body meets today to discuss the matter.

North Korea conducts launch

According to U.S., South Korean and Japanese officials, North Korea has conducted its much anticipated launch from the Musudan-ri site. The nature of the launch remains unclear, though North Korea has consistently said it planned to launch an Unha-2 rocket carrying Kwangmyongsong-2, an experimental communications satellite. The Australian reports that South Korean presidential spokesman Lee Dong-Kwan said the vehicle appeared to have carried a satellite. The launch took place at 10:30PM EDT Saturday. According to The Japan Times, there was a false alarm issued by the Japanese government earlier today. This latest announcement, however, has been confirmed by the U.S. State Department and the government of South Korea. Image: AP.

The U.S., Japan, and South Korea believe that any launch conducted by North Korea, regardless of mission, is a violation of United Nations Resolutions 1695 and 1718. Japan did not attempt an intercept (it had indicated it would intercept any debris from the vehicle that it would find threatening) and has requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. The request has been granted, and the Security Council will be meeting later today to address the matter.

An interesting image from AFP showing people watching South Korean news on the launch is provided below:


More information regarding the possible nature of the vehicle can be found here and here. Useful data can also be found at AGI. More details as they become available.

The Korea Herald
China Daily
Xinhua
MSNBC
CNN
Reuters
New York Times

SWF Executive Director and President contributed to just released 2008 UNIDIR Conference Report

SWF Executive Director Dr. Ray Williamson and SWF President Cynda Collins Arsenault co-authored an article entitled "Achieving a Sustainable Space Environment" as part of the Security in Space: The Next Generation Conference organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The conference, held from March 31 to April 1, 2008 was co-sponsored by SWF and the Simons Foundation.

Dr. Marshall Kaplan of Johns Hopkins Discusses Debris Removal Options

Dr. Marshall Kaplan of Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) was the featured speaker today for the Space Security Lunch Series co-sponsored by Secure World Foundation and the University of Colorado Aerospace Law and Policy Association (ALPA). His talk, held at the University of Colorado Law School, was titled "Space Debris: A Growth Industry."

Before an audience which included interested parties, students and a Constituent Advocate for Congressman Jared Polis, Dr. Kaplan introduced the problem of orbital debris from a historical perspective. He discussed how he proposed a method for extracting Sputnik 1 from orbit shortly after its launch and described how he participated in studies to deorbit Skylab safely, since the space station did not have the propulsive means to maneuver.

Dr. Kaplan then talked about current affairs, focusing on the increasing number of incidents ranging from the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test of January 2007 to the collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 in February of this year. Using these examples as foundation, Dr. Kaplan went on to introduce a variety of engineering solutions designed to remove debris (as opposed to mitigating future generation of debris, the second part of the problem).

Several students remarked at how unfamiliar they were with the problem, and looked forward to amount of work that they can be a part of as the international community works toward solutions to the problem. The Foundation and ALPA are grateful to Dr. Kaplan for taking the time to discuss this important issue.

NRO Director: Industrial Base Issues Flagged

A warning flare was ignited today regarding the health of the U.S. industrial base by Scott Large, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) here at the 25th National Space Symposium.

Large said the NRO has recently completed a new strategic plan with 11 specific action items – a plan that makes both the technical and business case for the national space security enterprise.

While specifics are classified, Large said that NRO is engaged in restoring confidence in what his organization is doing. There is need for an education process given the new Obama administration, as well as enhancing communication with Capitol Hill leadership.

“NRO is not a stand-alone organization,” Large explained, underscoring the skill set offered by others in the intelligence-gathering business.

Large noted the budget landscape that NRO is operating within. “It’s going to be difficult...this is not a cheap business…it’s hard, it takes time.”

Regarding the space architecture that NRO is trying to put in place, Large said moving innovative ideas out of the lab into space is key. “We’ve had spectacular successes,” he said, without going into details.

In closing remarks, Large flagged the need for stabilizing and strengthening the industrial base. He also urged putting in place a long term strategy beyond a 5 year budget cycle.

“It will be hard…it will take time,” Large emphasized.

-- Leonard David, SWF Research Associate

Secure World Foundation hires Victoria Samson as Director of Washington Operations

Secure World Foundation is pleased to announce the hiring of Victoria Samson as Director of Washington Operations.

Victoria will be responsible for engaging Congressional staffers and agency officials on matters related to space security and governance. Prior to her time at the foundation, Victoria was a Senior Analyst with the Center for Defense Information (CDI) since November 2001. Her areas of interest at CDI included missile defense, nuclear reductions, and emerging weapons technologies. Victoria is the author of numerous op-eds, analytical pieces, journal articles, and electronic updates on missile defense and space security matters, and provided an objective assessment of U.S. policy.

Prior to coming to CDI, Victoria was the senior policy associate at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of arms control groups in the Washington, D.C., area. She previously worked as a subcontractor on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agency's Directorate of Intelligence.

Victoria has an M.A. in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. She also holds a B.A. in political science with a specialization in international relations from University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).